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Abstract
Why did al-Mutawakkil end the Miḥna? The usual answer to this question assumes that he was
acknowledging the inevitable victory of the ʿulamāʾ. He is seen to be ‘cutting his losses’ by restoring and enforcing orthodoxy as the traditionalist ʿulamāʾ saw it. In this article I oﬀer a diﬀerent
answer. Al-Mutawakkil ended the Miḥna as one part of his broader eﬀort to establish his position
as sovereign and independent of the individuals and structures that had carried over from
al-Wāthiq’s reign. Eliminating the Miḥna was one strategy deployed in undermining and eliminating the “kingmakers” who had placed him on the throne. He correctly surmised that if left in
place these would impede his position and ultimately control him.
Keywords
Miḥna, al-Mutawakkil, al-Wāthiq, Ibn Abī Duʾād, Ītākh

Why did al-Mutawakkil end the Miḥ na? The usual answer to this question
assumes that he was acknowledging the inevitable victory of the ʿulamāʾ.1
He is seen to be cutting his losses by restoring and enforcing orthodoxy as
the traditionalists saw it. However, as Melchert has pointed out, he did
not implement “traditionalist Islam.”2 In this article I will oﬀer a new answer.
* Thanks are due to the members of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies for their helpfully generous comments, particularly John Nawas for his able and insightful commentary. James Montgomery also deserves recognition for his editorial prowess. This article is much stronger as a
result. Thanks are also due to Colby College for the generous Social Science Grant 01 2236
which funded the research for this article.
1
For example see M. Miah, The Reign of al-Mutawakkil, Dacca: Asiatic Society of Pakistan,
1969, p. 101.
2
C. Melchert, “Religious Policies of the Caliphs from Al-Mutawakkil to Al-Muqtadir, AH
232-295 /AD 847-908,” Islamic Law and Society 3 (1996): 330. Melchert has since softened his
stance a little. See C. Melchert, Aḥ mad Ibn Ḥ anbal, Oxford: Oneworld, 2006, p. 17. That alMutawakkil had a religious policy is clear given his restrictions on the dhimmī and Shīʿa. However, it is equally clear that he did not just replace the Miḥ na enforcing belief in the createdness
of the Qurʾān with a Miḥ na to impose its opposite (the traditionalist position). As well, his policies did not amount to a ‘restoration’ of Sunnism as deﬁned by the traditionalist muḥ addithūn. I
must thank Amikam Elad for encouraging me to clarify my thinking on this.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010
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Al-Mutawakkil ended the Miḥ na as part of his eﬀort to establish his position
as sovereign, independent of the forces that had placed him on the throne. He
eliminated individuals and structures that had carried over from the waning
days of al-Wāthiq’s reign, and also, implicitly, al-Maʾmūn’s and al-Muʿtaṣim’s.
He was speciﬁcally focused on undoing the inﬂuence of his brother’s men.3
Ending the Miḥ na was one strategy deployed in undermining and eliminating
the kingmakers.4 He correctly surmised that if left in place these would impede
his exercise of power, his position and ultimately control him. This, it seems,
was what they intended to do. Al-Mutawakkil used the rivalries inhering
between those ﬁgures to cause them to remove each other one by one. His
actions were calculated and tactically shrewd. Given the timing these were not
spontaneous falls from grace. By the end the only one left standing was Waṣīf,
one of the main conspirators in the plot that killed him. It is also important to
note that al-Mutawakkil was not just going after the members of the ‘cabal’
that enthroned him.5 He was generally asserting his dominance over the state.
Ending the Miḥ na was merely one part of this.
In an eﬀort to maintain his authority, the Caliph al-Mutawakkil was
engaged in factional politics, as were all of the caliphs. Al-Ṭabarī tells us that
there was serious discord between Ibn al-Zayyāt and Ibn Abī Duʾād. In one
instance in 229/843-844 Ibn al-Zayyāt instigated an investigation of Aḥmad
b. Abī Duʾād and the aṣḥ āb al-maẓālim clearly challenging him in an area
solidly under his purview.6 The Ṭahirid Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm was placed in charge
of this action, although al-Ṭabarī, by using the passive, indicates that Isḥāq
was only doing as he was told. The episode is a bit cryptic but it results in a

3
Almost all of whom were also his father’s men literally and ﬁguratively. See M. Al-Farrā, A
Critical Edition of Kitāb al-Buldān by al-Yaʿqūbī, unpublished PhD, University of Exeter, 1981,
pp. 26, 28, where one ﬁnds all of these ﬁgures listed as present for and prominent at the foundation of Samarra. Al-Yaʿqūbī also conveniently supplies a list of the major Turkish generals.
4
Lassner does not connect al-Mutawakkil’s removal of the cabal ﬁgures to the cessation of the
Miḥ na. He discusses some of al-Mutawakkil’s activities in the dispossession of elite ﬁgures but
views this as a result of ﬁnancial need. He does note that there was some ‘settling scores’ in the
process (more on this below): J. Lassner, The Middle East Remembered, Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2000, pp. 230-246. Kennedy notes that al-Mutawakkil was seeking independence of action but has a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent focus than I have here: H. Kennedy, When
Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World, Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2005, p. 236; also H. Kennedy,
The Armies of the Caliphs, New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 137. Gordon notes that al-Mutawakkil
eliminated the kingmakers in order to consolidate his power but does not take this any further:
M. Gordon, The Breaking of a Thousand Swords, Albany: State University of New York Press,
2001, p. 82.
5
There is some question as to whether there was a cabal, as we shall see.
6
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk, ed. M.J. de Goeje et al., III, Leiden: Brill, 1879,
p. 1331.
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number of ﬁgures (unnamed) being imprisoned.7 This anecdote gives a glimpse
of the struggle going on behind the scenes, behind the veneer of caliphal power
between three very inﬂuential ﬁgures that continued and intensiﬁed after
al-Wāthiq’s death.8 Isḥāq’s action at the behest of Ibn al-Zayyāt could explain
why al-Mutawakkil used Ītākh, instead of Isḥāq, to remove Ibn al-Zayyāt. As
a result of that tie al-Mutawakkil could not rely on him to take care of this
particular problem.9 These are, of course, manifestations of the complications
of dynamic political interaction driven by factional power sharing. Given his
reliance on them to do his dirty work al-Mutawakkil could not aﬀord to alienate too many of them at any one time. He relied on them in varying capacities
in order to balance the players on the ﬁeld. He became more selective in
assigning duties until he reached a point where he could remove one or the
other.10 This would eventually break down. Let us now turn to three instances
that will shed light more clearly on the problems of al-Mutawakkil’s rise and
his solutions.
There are diﬀering accounts of the enthronement of al-Mutawakkil.
Al-Ṭabarī’s is the most well known.11 Upon the unexpected death of al-Wāthiq
in an oven (tannūr) the most important ﬁgures present in Samarra gathered.12
The members of the shūrā were: Aḥmad b. Abī Duʾād, Ītākh, Waṣīf, ʿUmar b.

7
It is unclear if this episode is to be considered part of al-Wāthiq’s assault on the secretaries
or not.
8
Al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh al-Islam, ed. ʿUmar Tadmurī, Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1990, p.
334 (for years 231-240), notes that there was enmity between Ibn al-Zayyāt and Ibn Abī
Duʾād.
9
Note that Isḥāq had imprisoned Ibn al-Baʿīth, under orders from al-Mutawakkil, but
Bughā l-Sharābī, along with others, convinced him to furlough him. He promptly took ﬂight as
a result. There are other hints of this unreliability as well: al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1380. Generally speaking he has been viewed as a loyal and unambitious enforcer for the ʿAbbasid caliphs that
he served. On closer examination, he is a much more complex character. On the Ṭahirids see M.
Kaʿbi, Les Tahirides, Paris: Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1983.
10
Miah, Reign of al-Mutawakkil, p. 28, states that al-Faḍl b. Marwān’s removal was part of
al-Mutawakkil’s attempt to collect “stronger allies in order to remove Ītākh. . . .”
11
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1368-1370.
12
The circumstances of his death have always struck me as inordinately suspicious. Al-Ṭabarī
states that he suﬀered from edema (istiqsāʾ) of the abdomen, from which he found relief in heat.
Three members of the cabal that appointed al-Mutawakkil were present when his predecessor
died by being left in an oven (tannūr) too long: Ibn Abī Duʾād, ʿUmar b. Faraj, and Ibn al-Zayyāt:
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1363-1364. Al-Yaʿqūbī brieﬂy mentions the oven (which he describes
as a pit in the ground, “like an oven [tannūr] heated by tamarisk wood”): Taʾrīkh, ed. ʿAbd
al-Amīr Muhannā, II, Beirut: Muʾassasat al-ʿUlamī li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, 1993, p. 446. T. El-Hibri,
“The Image of the Caliph al-Wāthiq: A Riddle of Religious and Historical Signiﬁcance,”
Quaderni di Studi Arabi 19 (2001): 41-60, discusses al-Wāthiq’s death but does not address its
suspiciousness.
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Faraj, Ibn al-Zayyāt, and Aḥmad b. Khālid Abū l-Wazīr.13 They quickly decided
on al-Wāthiq’s minor son Muḥammad but Waṣīf objected. The others concurred that he was far too young; such an appointment would be manifestly
illegitimate. They then wrangled back and forth until they chose what they
presumably thought to be the weakest, least objectionable and most controllable adult candidate, al-Wāthiq’s 26 year old brother Jaʿfar.14 After proving to
him that al-Wāthiq was really dead, Ibn Abī Duʾād anointed him Caliph by
placing robes upon him and addressing him as Commander of the Faithful.
Jaʿfar then turned to the most pressing business and gave out pay for the
troops, four months worth for the army and the Shākiriyya. The Hāshimiyyūn
received eight months while the Maghāriba were oﬀered three.15 Ibn al-Zayyāt
drew up the oath which everyone was to swear and the shūrā then settled
down to the task of choosing a regnal title. The ﬁrst option, al-Muntaṣir
bi-Allāh, suggested by Ibn al-Zayyāt was in favour until early the next morning
when it was supplanted by Ibn Abī Duʾād’s recommendation of al-Mutawakkil
ʿalā Allāh.16 These events took place on the 23rd of Dhū l-Ḥ ijja, 232/August 10,
847 before sunset.17 Whether this occurred as al-Ṭabarī describes it is certainly
open to debate but one point clearly comes through: al-Mutawakkil was not a
man in charge of his own destiny. Al-Ṭabarī’s narrative of his reign is tied
together with the thread of al-Mutawakkil’s struggle to become so. His ﬁrst
act as Caliph was to send Ītākh to arrest and torture Ibn al-Zayyāt, which he
did on the 7th of Ṣafar 233/September 22, 847. He lingered about a month
before dying.18

13
Al-Farrā, Kitāb al-Buldān, p. 28: al-Yaʿqūbī places the four civilians in this group with
al-Muʿtaṣim at the founding of Samarra (and the announcement of the purchase of the land).
On p. 26 he lists the names of the major Turkish slaves of al-Muʿtaṣim, including Ītākh, Waṣīf
and Sīmā l-Dimashqī, whom he had purchased during the reign of al-Maʾmūn.
14
In recounting the reasons for al-Mutawakkil’s anger towards Ibn al-Zayyāt, al-Ṭabarī paints
a portrait of al-Mutawakkil as a weakling, bullied by and submitting to everyone. It is readily
apparent that al-Wāthiq’s oﬃcials did not seem overly concerned to position themselves in alMutawakkil’s favor in preparation for his eventual succession. They all seemed to presume that
al-Wāthiq’s son would be the next caliph. This is borne out by the failed attempt to make this the
case. But for Waṣīf ’s irrefutable objection it would have been thus.
15
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1369-1370.
16
Perhaps this is the ﬁrst inkling of a power shift initially in favor of Ibn Abī Duʾād.
17
For all date conversions to the Gregorian calendar I used an online utility at http://www
.islamicity.com/PrayerTimes/hijriconverter1a.htm. These coincide with those given by Kraemer
in his translation: al-Ṭabarī, Incipient Decline, trans. J. Kraemer, Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1989.
18
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1376-1377. Al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, p. 334 (for years 231-240) hints
that it was Ibn Abī Duʾād who tortured and killed Ibn al-Zayyāt.
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Al-Yaʿqūbī’s version is, as always, more succinct. In this case it is vastly different but with some interesting similarities.19 First, there was no cabal. The
oath was taken to al-Wāthiq’s son before he died in the oven. With no explanation of the discrepancy, we are then told that al-Mutawakkil became Caliph at
the end of Dhū l-Ḥ ijja 232: “the ﬁrst to take the oath of allegiance to him were
Sīmā l-Turkī, known as al-Dimashqī and Waṣīf al-Turkī.”20 These two, within
the hour, were dispatched to distribute eight months pay to the troops. This
seems to have been instrumental in maintaining order and ensuring a smooth
transition. Then the children of seven caliphs were gathered to take the oath
of allegiance to the new Caliph. The list is an impressive representation of
ʿAbbasid familial support, in stark contrast to that not aﬀorded to al-Maʾmūn.21
The list of names is as follows: al-Manṣūr b. al-Mahdī, al-ʿAbbās b. al-Hādī,
Aḥmad b. al-Rashīd, ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Amīn, Mūsā b. al-Maʾmūn and his
brothers, Abū Aḥmad b. al-Muʿtaṣim and his sisters, and ﬁnally Muḥammad
b. al-Wāthiq.22 Immediately following this list of names we are told that forty
days later al-Mutawakkil brought low and tortured to death Ibn al-Zayyāt.
Al-Yaʿqūbī adds that no one was likely to miss him very much as he was a
rather loathesome fellow. As an intriguing but speculative sidenote, Ibn
al-Zayyāt was credited with the creation of the tannūr, a torture device resembling an iron maiden. In a poetic turn, he was made a victim of it in his last
days. This would be all the more poetic if we read al-Wāthiq’s death in an
“oven” not literally but as a euphemism for Ibn al-Zayyāt’s device.23 This can
be no more than speculative, however connecting up the suspiciousness of
al-Wāthiq’s death, the presence of Ibn al-Zayyāt (and the others) at it and the
odd reference to dying in an oven would make greater sense of it. It also highlights the extreme precariousness of al-Mutawakkil’s position. Radical and
rapid action was needed. Returning from the realm of speculation to the
ﬁrmer ground of reality, the forty-day interval before removing Ibn al-Zayyāt
coincides with a mourning period and is exactly the same chronological framework as that found in al-Ṭabarī — although al-Ṭabarī makes you count the
days while al-Yaʿqūbī explicitly tells you the number. In any case, al-Yaʿqūbī
makes clear that at the earliest opportunity al-Mutawakkil began to go after
19
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, pp. 446-447; al-Masʿūdī, Murūj al-dhahab wa-maʿādin al-jawhar,
ed. ʿAbd al-Amīr Muhannā, IV, Beirut: Muʾassasat al-ʿUlamī li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, 1991, p. 94 is even
more succinct.
20
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 446. For more on these two see al-Farrā, Kitāb al-Buldān, p. 32.
Ṣīmā and Waṣīf received large allotments in Samarra seemingly on par with Ītākh.
21
For more on that see John Nawas’ article in this volume.
22
Note that the last listed is the failed heir of al-Ṭabarī’s version. Of course, the list follows
the order of the caliphs.
23
Thanks go to James Montgomery for helping me see this possibility.
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his brother’s men. No intermediaries are listed as doing the job for him, or
deemed important enough to mention.
In the year 233/847-848 four of the six members of the cabal were eliminated from power and discussion of either the createdness or uncreatedness of
the Qurʾān was forbidden.24 The ﬁfth (Ītākh) was eliminated in early 235/849
and the sixth (Waṣīf ) as noted above would outlive al-Mutawakkil.25 Lassner
notes that Waṣīf became chamberlain immediately before Ītākh’s removal but
then disappears from the chronicles for ten years, resurfacing as the target of
al-Mutawakkil’s dispossession brigade and thus also in the plot to kill him.26
He argues that going after Waṣīf in 247/861 (i.e. before the assassination) was
solely motivated by ﬁnancial need and that this exigency drove most of the
dispossessions. Clearly there was monetary gain to be had. However I see other
impulses at work. The ﬁscal incentive might have been one way to get someone to do the ‘shake-down’ of a rival but the net eﬀect was to empower the
Caliph at the expense of everyone else. With this in mind, it is interesting to
note that for every anniversary of enthronement (early in his reign at least)
al-Mutawakkil removed an important ﬁgure. This is the context of the ending
of the Miḥ na. Ītākh tortured Ibn al-Zayyāt to death.27 Ibn Abī Duʾād had a
stroke.28 Al-Faḍl b. Marwān was removed from the Dīwān al-Kharāj in the
middle of Ramaḍān 233/848.29 ʿUmar b. Faraj was arrested in the same month
by Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm.30 Aḥmad b. Khālid Abū l-Wazīr was also humiliated three
months later in Dhū l-Ḥ ijja, on the ﬁrst anniversary of al-Mutawakkil’s
enthronement.31 For reasons left unclear Abū l-Wazīr,32 ʿUmar b. Faraj and
24
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 447; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1412. Al-Ṭabarī tells us as part of
narrating the events surrounding the burial of Aḥmad b. Naṣr al-Khuzāʿī that al-Mutawakkil
forbade this discussion at the beginning of his reign. Al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāﬁʿiyya al-kubrā, ed.
Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Ṭanāḥī, II, Cairo: ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥ alabī, 1964-1976, p. 54, says that it
was in 234.
25
Unfortunately, al-Dīnawarī and Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ’s chronicles end before this episode.
Lassner, The Middle East Remembered, p. 253, notes that Waṣīf was the only one of the cabal to
survive.
26
Lassner, The Middle East Remembered, p. 245.
27
Al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, p. 334 (for years 231-240) gives credit to Ibn Abī Duʾād for this. He
also gives Ibn al-Zayyāt’s death year as 233: see p. 335. Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 448, does not
say who gets credit but al-Mutawakkil orders it and it is done.
28
Al-Baghdādī, al-Farq bayna l-ﬁraq, Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Maʿārif, 1910, pp. 159-160, states
that he had his stroke after being imprisoned by al-Mutawakkil; al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 448,
is ambiguous on this due to lacunae.
29
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1379.
30
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1377. He adds that ʿUmar was then released.
31
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, p. 1378.
32
Abū l-Wazīr was subjected to al-Wāthiq’s ire as he assaulted the secretaries in 229/843:
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, p. 1335.
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al-Faḍl b. Marwān survived. The plot against Ītākh began in 234/849 on the
second anniversary of his enthronement. Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm would die on the
third anniversary in 235/850 followed almost exactly one solar year later by
both his son and his brother Muḥammad in 236/851.33
For further insights let us now turn to the descriptions of the demise of
Aḥmad b. Abī Duʾād and caliphal regrets for the Miḥ na.34 Al-Ṭabarī says that
he died in Muḥarram 240/854 and that his son predeceased him by twenty
days.35 However his political activities ended long before his dispossession and
later death. Ibn Abī Duʾād suﬀered a debilitating stroke in Jumādā II 233/848
and was paralyzed.36 Hence, he was removed as a player six months after alMutawakkil’s enthronement and three months after the death of Ibn al-Zayyāt.
Thus he went on to survive for approximately seven more years as an invalid.
This appears to be straight forward but there is a complication in al-Ṭabarī’s
account as he mentions that in Ṣafar 237/August 851, slightly more than four
years after enthronement, al-Mutawakkil was infuriated by Ibn Abī Duʾād and
thus it was at this point that he dispossessed both him and his sons.37 Al-Ṭabarī
explicitly states that he was paralyzed, and thus not dead. Therefore, almost
four years after his stroke al-Mutawakkil moved against him. I posit that given
that Ibn Abī Duʾād was incapacitated and that the sons were certainly less
inﬂuential than the father, there was, from a power perspective, little need to
go after them immediately — i.e. they could be put on the back burner and
dealt with later. They were no longer an immediate threat.
Al-Yaʿqūbī says that “paralysis befell him.”38 The context agrees with
al-Ṭabarī’s dating of the stroke in 233/848. Al-Yaʿqūbī then goes on to tell us
that al-Mutawakkil appointed Ibn Abī Duʾād’s son Muḥammad in his stead.39
Unfortunately this is followed by a lacuna. The text tantalizingly resumes “and
indeed he was imprisoned because of the falsity of his words.”40 In agreement
with al-Ṭabarī, Ibn Abī Duʾād’s son was arrested in 237 on account of his
33
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, pp. 1403, 1404-1407; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fī l-taʾrīkh, ed. C.J. Tornberg, VII, Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1965, p. 52.
34
Part of what follows is based upon Appendix B of J. Turner, Inquisition and the Deﬁnition
of Identity in Early ʿAbbasid History, unpublished PhD, University of Michigan, 2001, pp. 290-292.
35
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1421; al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, p. 46 (for years 231-240); al-Masʿūdī,
Murūj al-dhahab, IV, p. 108; Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila, ed. S. Diwald-Walzer, Beirut:
Imprimerie Catholique, 1961, pp. 62-67. Unhelpfully, Ibn al-Murtaḍā does not mention a
death date.
36
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1379; al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, p. 46 (for years 231-240), mentions
the extent of the paralysis without speciﬁcally dating it.
37
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1410-1411.
38
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 448.
39
Al-Ṭabarī does not include this information.
40
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 448.
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father and then he died.41 Here occurs yet another unfortunate lacuna, which
when considered along with al-Yaʿqūbī’s phrasing leaves open the possibility
that Muḥammad died at a later date. But, the context indicates 237. However,
very importantly al-Yaʿqūbī does not give a death notice for Ibn Abī Duʾād.
We are not even told that he died. He ceases to appear in the text after noting
his paralysis. This gives credence to my position that Ibn Abī Duʾād’s importance waned to the point that al-Mutawakkil could put oﬀ dealing with him
until later in his reign. Now let us turn to two intriguingly diﬀerent accounts.
The version related by al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī begins with someone telling
al-Mutawakkil that Aḥmad b. Naṣr al-Khuzāʿī’s42 severed head recited the
Qurʾān until it was buried after being impaled for six years on a pole.43 AlMutawakkil is greatly distressed by this news and the next time Ibn al-Zayyāt,
as vizier, comes into his presence, he asks who killed Aḥmad b. Naṣr. He
replies: “O Commander of the Faithful may God burn me in the ﬁre if the
Commander of the Faithful al-Wāthiq killed him for anything other than
unbelief.” He then asks Harthama,44 who happens to walk by at that moment,
the same question. He responds: “O Commander of the Faithful may God cut
me limb from limb if the Commander of the Faithful al-Wāthiq killed him for
anything other than unbelief.” Then Ibn Abī Duʾād also happens to walk by
and is greeted with the same question. He proclaims: “O Commander of the
Faithful may God strike me with paralysis if the Commander of the Faithful
al-Wāthiq killed him for anything other than unbelief.” Then al-Mutawakkil
notes that:
As for Ibn al-Zayyāt, he was consumed by the ﬁre and as for Harthama he ﬂed
and went into the desert and passed by the tribe Khuzāʿa and a man in the tribe
41

Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 453.
Aḥmad b. Naṣr was involved in a revolt in Baghdād in 231/846 and was executed by
al-Wāthiq as a result of failing to answer correctly in the Miḥ na.
43
Al-Khaṭib al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh Baghdād, ed. Muṣt ̣afā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭāʾ, V, Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1931, p. 178 (entry for Aḥmad b. Naṣr); Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya, X,
Cairo: Mat ̣baʿat al-Saʿāda, 1932-1939, p. 306, includes al-Khaṭīb’s version verbatim up to the
last line.
44
Harthama b. Naṣr appears as part of the clean up surrounding Ītākh. He was Ītākh’s deputy
in Egypt. He was dispossessed as well: al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 449. His name is given
as Harthama b. Naṣr al-Jabalī in al-Kindī, The Governors and Judges of Egypt, ed. R. Guest and
A.A. Askalami, London: Gibb Memorial Trust, 1912, pp. 196, 197: in the year 233 as part of
the allegiance oath in Miṣr for al-Mutawakkil (p. 196); the full entry for him is included on
p. 197. The editor identiﬁes him with Harthama b. Naḍr al-Khuttalī: see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III,
p. 1267. That person was part of the ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn plot. He was released and made governor of al-Dīnawar by al-Afshīn. According to al-Kindī, al-Mutawakkil wrote to him in
234/848-9 forbidding discussion about the Qurʾān. Harthama died apparently soon afterwards
and was replaced by his son.
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knew him and he said: “O assemblage of the Khuzāʿa, this is the man who killed
the son of our uncle, Aḥmad b. Naṣr’ and they cut him limb from limb.”45 As for
Ibn Abī Duʾād then indeed God imprisoned him in his body.46

There is a version similar to this in ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī’s older al-Farq
bayna l-Firaq, although it is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.47 Thumāma b. Ashras
denounces Aḥmad b. Naṣr to al-Wāthiq who then has him killed.48 Al-Wāthiq
almost immediately regrets killing Aḥmad and repents. He then turns to blame
Thumāma, Ibn Abī Duʾād,49 and Ibn al-Zayyāt. Ibn al-Zayyāt protests: “If
killing him were not the answer then may God, most high, kill me between
the water and the ﬁre.” Ibn Abī Duʾād, not to be outdone, adds: “May God,
most high, imprison me in my skin if killing him were not the right answer.”
Thumāma intones: “May God, most high, give the sword power over me if
you were not correct in killing him.” Naturally, the divine response is swift:
God, most high, heard the call of each one from among them. As for Ibn al-Zayyāt
then verily he was killed in the baths. He fell in his clothes and died between the
water and the ﬁre. As for Ibn Abī Duʾād then al-Mutawakkil, may God bless him,
imprisoned him and the stroke befell him in his prison and he remained a prisoner in his skin by paralysis until he died. As for Thumāma, then verily he left for
Mecca and so the Khuzāʿa saw him between al-Ṣafā and al-Marwa. A man from
among them called out and said “O people of Khuzāʿa, this is who denounced
(brought evil upon) your companion Aḥmad b. Naṣr50 and he causes evil in his
blood.” And so the Banū Khuzāʿa gathered about him with their swords until they
had killed him.51 Then they carried out his corpse from the Ḥ aram and so the
beasts of prey ate him outside of the Ḥ aram. And so this was just as God, most
high, said: “so he tasted the evil result of his disbelief, and the consequences of his
disbelief was loss.”52

This version is included in a discussion of the “heretical beliefs” of Thumāma.
Thus he comes at the end, as he is the focus of the narrative.53 These narratives
45

I have yet to ﬁnd an account of Aḥmad b. Naṣr’s trial in which Harthama was involved.
Al-Khat ̣īb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh Baghdād, V, p. 178; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, X, p. 306, adds
“meaning by paralysis — God smote him before his death by four years. . . .”
47
Al-Baghdādī, Farq, pp. 159-160.
48
As with Harthama, I have yet to ﬁnd an account in which Thumāma was involved.
49
Whose name is given as Ibn Daʾūd.
50
The text has a clear scribal error with Fahr instead of Naṣr.
51
One wonders if there is not an anti-Khuzāʿa subtext; as violating the Ḥ aram by assaulting
and killing someone in iḥ rām would not reﬂect well on them even if the cause were manifestly
just.
52
Al-Baghdādī, Farq, pp. 159-60, quoting Qurʾān 65:9.
53
I ﬁnd it intriguing that this story is told in relation to the trial of Aḥmad b. Naṣr and not
Ibn Ḥ anbal. God exacts punishment upon them for their actions against Aḥmad b. Naṣr but not
46
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are clearly literary in their purpose. For example, we know that Ītākh killed
Ibn al-Zayyāt. As well, Thumāma drops out and is readily replaced by
Harthama. In al-Baghdādī’s narrative time is compressed with the blame,
regret and repentance all tied to al-Wāthiq. Although, note that al-Mutawakkil
still receives credit for eliminating Ibn Abī Duʾād. As they were working apparently from the same source al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī was correcting for the fact
that Thumāma had died during the reign of al-Maʾmūn. His changes have the
side eﬀect of focusing the episode more directly on al-Mutawakkil. Both seek
to drive home the point that the Miḥ na was something to be regretted and
that the Caliph ended it to atone for the sin it entailed, while clearly vindicating Aḥmad b. Naṣr and his rebellion. Ending the Miḥ na becomes, ﬁguratively,
atonement for that and this ﬁgure becomes representational and symbolic for
the restoration of orthodox Islam as interpreted by the ʿulamāʾ approximately
200 years later. Of course al-Mutawakkil merely ended the Miḥ na and did not
enforce its opposite in its place. His religious policy was not restorational. It
was geared to make him independent of those by whom he was surrounded.
Both narratives give God credit for punishing those involved with the Miḥna and
thus sanctioning the ending of it. It has been retooled such that al-Mutawakkil
is praised for restoring Sunnism. In it the Caliph is merely an executive. It
peels away any sense of caliphal power concerns and leaves only spiritual ones.54
These stand in direct opposition to the conclusions one derives from the
chronicles that the actions of the Caliph were methodically and strategically
geared to enhance his power and independence. In the case of Ibn Abī Duʾād,
al-Mutawakkil had no need to rush his assault on either him or his family as
the father’s paralysis did most of the job for him. This however was not a permanent solution as the son’s inﬂuence could grow. Were it to do so it would
do so through the implementation of the Miḥ na. Thus al-Mutawakkil crushed
it before it did. There was no sense in moving against him immediately after
the stroke as there were more immediate threats abounding. To elucidate this
point let us turn to the third episode to be examined.
There are two main accounts of the assault on Ītākh.55 The most cited is that
of al-Ṭabarī.56 As in many instances al-Yaʿqūbī’s is diﬀerent but much less so

because of how they behaved towards the paragon of Sunni steadfastness. I will have more to say
on this in another venue.
54
I am developing this idea more fully in a larger project.
55
Portions of the following are based on segments of a paper on Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm presented
to the 2002 MESA conference. It has been almost completely altered.
56
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1384-1387; al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, V, pp. 106-107 (for years 231240), tells largely the same story as al-Ṭabarī, clearly using him as a source. He does not go into
as much detail about Ītākh being separated from his entourage.
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here than elsewhere.57 Al-Yaʿqūbī has the events beginning in Dhū l-Qaʿda,
234/June-July, 849,58 shortly before the second anniversary of al-Mutawakkil’s
enthronement. Al-Ṭabarī’s account concurs.59 Al-Ṭabarī has the events come
to a head in the beginning of the year 235/849 with Ītākh dying six months
later in Jumādā II 235/December 84960 exactly two years after Ibn Abī Duʾād
was paralyzed. Al-Ṣafadī cites al-Ṭabarī incorrectly when he states that Isḥāq b.
Ibrāhīm and al-Ḥ asan b. Sahl died on the same day in 236.61 Al-Ṭabarī does
not say this. He states that Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm’s son and brother Muḥammad
died in the same month as al-Ḥ asan b. Sahl.62 Ibn al-Athīr notes that al-Ḥ asan
b. Sahl died that year as well63 but amends this later by saying that “it was said
that al-Ḥ asan died in the year 236.”64 The question of the dating of this episode is very important because if al-Ṭabarī and al-Yaʿqūbī are accurate, then
the equally important Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm died at most six months after Ītākh
and exactly one year after arresting him.65 Consequently he also died on the
57

Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 449; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1383-1387.
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, pp. 448-449.
59
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1383-1384, gives three dates for the departure on pilgrimage:
18th Dhū l-Qaʿda 234 (June 849), sometime in the year 233, and 17 Dhū l-Ḥ ijja 233 (July
848). Given the order of presentation he clearly prefers the 234 date. Al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh,
p. 107 (for years 231-240) places the death date as Jumādā I, 234/848; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil,
VII, pp. 46, 47, agrees with al-Ṭabarī and states that Ītākh died in Jumādā II 235; al-Ṣūlī, Kitāb
Al-Awrāq (Kniga Listov), ed. V.I. Baliaev and A.B. Khalidov, St. Petersburg: Tsentr Peterburgskoe
vostokovedenie, 1998, p. 502 brieﬂy mentions it under the year 235. Miah gives two sets of dates
based on al-Ṭabarī (however al-Ṭabarī gives three) for the onset of these events — 18th Dhū
l-Qaʿda of 233 or 234. He argues that the 234 date is more accurate: Miah, Reign of al-Mutawakkil, p. 38. He also accepts Ītākh’s death date as given by al-Ṭabarī.
60
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1386.
61
Al-Ṣafadī, al-Wafī min al-wafayāt, ed. Muḥammad Yūsuf Najm, VIII, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1981, p. 397.
62
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1406. The cause of al-Ḥ asan’s death is given as a result of a
medicinal draught he drank on either the 25th of Dhū l-Qaʿda or the ﬁrst of Dhū l-Ḥ ijja. His
appearance here is more than a little odd, as John Nawas pointed out to me, given the conventional wisdom that he had a nervous breakdown after the murder of his brother al-Faḍl at the
beginning of al-Maʾmūn’s reign. However on closer examination he does appear to have remained
an active, but not particularly good, astrologer at court. Al-Ṭabarī has him predicting a long
50 year reign for al-Wāthiq ten days before his demise: al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1364. He also
apparently died with a great deal of debt.
63
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, VI, p. 52.
64
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, VI, p. 53. Al-Yaʿqūbī says that al-Ḥ asan died “in this year” with the
context indicating 235: al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 449.
65
Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughyat al-ṭalab fī taʾrīkh Ḥ alab, ed. S. Zakkār, III, Damascus, 1988,
p. 1411 gives his age at death as 58 (or 56), which renders a birth date of 177/793. Given this
chronology he was 29 years old (Hijrī) when appointed to Baghdad in 206/821; Ibn Abī Ṭāhir
Ṭayfūr, Sechster Band Des Kitâb Bagdâd, ed. H. Keller, Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1908, p. 134;
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1062. Thus he was 41 at the beginning of the Miḥ na.
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third anniversary of al-Mutawakkil’s enthronement. That his son and brother
died in the same month exactly one solar year after him adds further intrigue
as the brother was executed and the son’s cause of death is unstated. The elimination of Isḥāq and Ītākh, two very powerful rival focal points for power,
within such a short time frame was certainly propitious for al-Mutawakkil.
Let us brieﬂy consider the two main narratives while highlighting some of
the diﬀerences.66 The story begins with Ītākh asking al-Mutawakkil for permission to go on the Ḥ ajj shortly after they had had a drunken row. Al-Ṭabarī
indicates that Ītākh was being set up and that he was tricked into asking to go
by someone working for al-Mutawakkil.67 Al-Yaʿqūbī simply notes that a ruse
was employed.68 Clothing serves as an important literary marker in both
accounts. Al-Yaʿqūbī describes Ītākh as leaving in his best clothing.69 This
appears to be a subtle criticism that he was not embarking on the Ḥ ajj in a
pious state. Al-Mutawakkil then set the plot into motion. In al-Yaʿqūbī, alMutawakkil sent two ﬁgures to meet up with Ītākh at two diﬀerent points on
his return trip, in order to put him at ease; presumably to foster complacency.70
In al-Ṭabarī’s version one of these is instructed to bring gifts for this explicit
purpose; to lower his guard when he is ordered to enter Baghdad with Isḥāq b.
Ibrāhīm.71 The subterfuge works and Ītākh enters willingly with him. This is
where a striking divergence between al-Ṭabarī and al-Yaʿqūbī occurs. Al-Ṭabarī
delves into the elaborate measures that Isḥāq had to go through to isolate Ītākh
from his troops. This is a clear assertion that Ītākh was able to project his
power further aﬁeld than just Samarra and that Isḥāq had to be careful, even
in his own powerbase of Baghdad. In al-Yaʿqūbī there is no trickery to lure
him into Baghdad or to separate him from his forces. Isḥāq comes out and
orders the “removal of the black [clothing] and the sword and the belt. He
brought him into Baghdad in a white qabāʾ and a white turban.”72 Interestingly, al-Ṭabarī has him entering Baghdad under very diﬀerent conditions but
dressed in a white qabāʾ with a sword and sword belt.73 This is speculative but
one could read this as visually marking him as a rebel. In al-Yaʿqūbī it was
66

Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 449; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1383-1387.
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1383.
68
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 449.
69
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 449.
70
Jaʿfar b. Dīnār al-Khayyāṭ and Saʿīd b. Ṣāliḥ, the chamberlain.
71
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1384; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, VII, p. 46, includes the gift subterfuge as well.
72
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 449. The qabāʾ also underlines his non-Arabness (although it is
usually associated with Persianate peoples): see R.P. Dozy, Supplement aux dictionnaires arabes,
Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2007.
73
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1385.
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imposed on him, i.e. Isḥāq arrested him in the open outside Baghdad. In
al-Ṭabarī he was not under duress, at least on entering the city. In stark contrast to the robes in which he had embarked upon the Ḥ ajj, Ītākh was stripped
of the accoutrements of power and association with the ʿAbbasid regime by
Isḥāq who would naturally have been wearing the ʿAbbasid black.74 Thus the
two ﬁgures stood side by side in contrasting black and white. Both al-Ṭabarī
and al-Yaʿqūbī agree that he was then imprisoned in Khuzayma’s palace and
stripped of all his possessions75 and burdened with heavy chains.76 Next, Isḥāq
seized Ītākh’s son al-Manṣūr and his secretaries (kuttāb), Sulaymān b. Wahb77
and Qudāma b. Ziyād. Al-Ṭabarī states that the other son, Muẓaﬀar, was taken
as well.78 The two secretaries were ﬂogged and curiously Qudāma converted to
Islam. In al-Yaʿqūbī’s version they were made to rebuke Ītākh. The son is
ordered to spit in his father’s face but refuses to do so, asserting that while the
two secretaries are servants and have to do the bidding of the Commander of
the Faithful, he does not.79 Note that this was taking place in front of Isḥāq
and not the Caliph. It is not the Caliph who had ordered him to do this
but he was clearly aware that Isḥāq’s command must have had, on some level,
the Caliph’s approval. In this description we are able to observe one very
powerful ﬁgure in factional court politics humiliating and degrading another
with the Caliph’s blessing. Next al-Yaʿqūbī tells us that Ītākh lingered for a
couple of days, died in Khuzayma’s palace and then his body was ignominiously thrown into the Tigris. No cause of death is given but it was clearly not
a natural one.
On this al-Ṭabarī’s version diﬀers. Ītākh died in Isḥāq’s palace not Khuzayma’s and the method of his death is explained. Al-Ṭabarī relates two versions.
74
However, Ibn Kathīr states that Ītākh entered Baghdad in great splendour: Ibn Kathīr,
al-Bidāya, X, p. 313.
75
Gordon, The Breaking of a Thousand Swords, p. 84, sees the hand of the abnāʾ in all of this,
as it is to the house of Khuzayma b. Khāzim that he is brought and in which he is captured.
Khuzayma was from a prominent family that can be construed as belonging to the abnāʾ, but
which is not explicitly labeled as such.
76
Al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, p. 107 (for years 231-240). Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, VII, p. 47, mentions the 80 raṭls of chains as well.
77
Ibn Khallikān relates that upon leaving Ītākh’s service he went into the service of Ashīnās:
Ibn Khallikān, Ibn Khallikān’s Biographical Dictionary, ed. W.M. de Slane, I, Paris: Oriental
Translation Fund, 1843-1871, p. 597. Miah, Reign of al-Mutawakkil, pp. 33-34, argues that the
inclusion of Sulaymān b. Wahb was aimed at eliminating corruption in the “revenue administration.” It is more likely that Sulaymān’s removal on this occasion had a great deal more to do with
his ties to Ītākh than anything else.
78
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1385-1386. Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, VII, p. 47, notes that the
two sons remained in prison until al-Mutawakkil died.
79
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 449. Gordon, The Breaking of a Thousand Swords, p. 84, makes a
similar observation.
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The ﬁrst does not give a cause of death other than it is attested that he was not
beaten or otherwise marked up.80 Isḥāq takes pains to demonstrate this to the
public and to other oﬃcials.81 In the second version, he was allowed to eat his
ﬁll, and then water was withheld from him.82 This mode of execution had the
virtue of leaving no marks and was not as visually apparent as starvation.83
Thus the two versions in al-Ṭabarī are complementary, as are these with the
one in al-Yaʿqūbī. The cast is basically the same as is the gist. This is one of the
few instances when al-Ṭabarī explicitly explains what has happened and why.
He states that Ītākh had grown too powerful and that the Caliph had to have
him killed outside of Samarra because otherwise he could have mounted a
successful resistance. Al-Ṭabarī goes into great detail about the forces that the
two commanders had alongside themselves. He also delves into the elaborate
measures that Isḥāq had to go through to separate Ītākh from his cohort. One
detail unsettles the reliability of his account; al-Ṭabarī does not relate what
happened among Ītākh’s forces once they became aware of the arrest. The fact
that his forces oﬀered no resistance is striking and lends an air of forgery to the
story. None of the sources record an uprising or disturbance that one would
expect from such a large force in Baghdad, given the circumstances.84 There is
one bit of information that al-Ṭabarī includes that further clouds the waters.
Ītākh appealed to one of his jailers, “Go and greet the emir and say, ‘Indeed
you know what al-Muʿtaṣim and al-Wāthiq commanded me about it concerning your matter. I defended you as much as was possible for me. And so this
80

Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1386-1387; al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, p. 107 (for years 231-240).
Other local government oﬃcials were called in to witness that Ītākh “died a natural death
and there were no marks upon him”: Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1386; al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, p. 107
(for years 231-240). It is worth noting that the raw exercise of power must be disguised even to
other loyal oﬃcials.
82
Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1386-1387. Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, X, p. 313, states that he died
of thirst: they fed him but gave him no water. Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, VII, p. 47, includes this
reason as well.
83
This parallels the deaths of ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn, ʿUjayf b. ʿAnbasa, al-Afshīn and others
who had at one time been close conﬁdants to the Caliph and then had somehow become a threat or
disloyal. For al-Afshīn see J. Turner, “Al-Afshīn, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?,” in: ʿAbbasid Studies II:
Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies, ed. J. Nawas, Leuven: Peeters, 2010,
pp. 119-141. Kennedy, When Baghdad Ruled, pp. 238-239, discusses the shift to non-marking
executions as a sign of the dignity/nobility of the executed for a later period. In this case at hand
I think this unlikely to have been a mark of the dignity of Ītākh and more likely to have been a
subterfuge to give plausible deniability to the Caliph. It also provided protection to the perpetrator as he could not have been charged with murder by the victim’s relatives. See Lassner, The
Middle East Remembered, p. 241.
84
See Miah, Reign of al-Mutawakkil, p. 33, who states that Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm helped to stave
oﬀ unrest in Samarra as a result of this incident. He repeats this on p. 39 but oﬀers little evidence. He notes that Ītākh’s fall did not precipitate a “crisis.”
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should be of good use for you’.”85 The implication of course is that this favor
should now be repaid. He then made a plea for leniency for his two sons,
which Isḥāq apparently honored. This is extremely odd because I can ﬁnd no
account of any event in which Ītākh interceded on Isḥāq’s behalf. That is unless
we consider this a reference to Isḥāq’s encounter with al-Muʿtaṣim when the
latter asks him about what he had done wrong compared to al-Maʾmūn in
choosing people to work for him.86 However this seems an unlikely choice.
The inclusion of these details causes one to ﬁnd al-Yaʿqūbī to be the more reliable of the two.
It is interesting to note the points upon which al-Yaʿqūbī and al-Ṭabarī’s
accounts converge and thus conﬁrm each other. They both note that alMutawakkil had to trick Ītākh into going on the Ḥ ajj.87 They both agree that he
entered Baghdad in a white qabāʾ. They both note that he was held for a few
days at Khuzayma’s palace. In al-Yaʿqūbī he died and was thrown in the Tigris.
In al-Ṭabarī, Isḥāq takes him on a boat on the Tigris up to his palace. Both
al-Yaʿqūbī and al-Ṭabarī agree that Sulaymān b. Wahb88 and Qudāma b. Ziyād,
as Ītākh’s secretaries, were imprisoned. In al-Yaʿqūbī they were made to spew
invective at their former boss. Al-Yaʿqūbī tells us of the one son being imprisoned with his father and his refusal to denigrate him. Al-Ṭabarī tells us that
two sons were imprisoned and of Isḥāq’s leniency towards them.89 The convergences are as telling as the diﬀerences. What comes through clearly is that
Ītākh was a threat to al-Mutawakkil who removed him using a rival as part of
a calculated strategy. As a ﬁnal note we can speculate as to the cause of Isḥāq
b. Ibrāhīm’s death on the 23rd of Dhū l-Ḥ ijja90 (July 8, 850) on the exact third
anniversary of al-Mutawakkil’s enthronement. The date alone argues against
a natural death, as does the issuance of the succession arrangement three
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In al-Ṭabarī this anecdote is included as an addition, an afterthought. In Ibn al-Athīr it
becomes an integral part of the story: al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1386; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, VII,
pp. 46-47.
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Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1326-1328. This is included under the year 227/842 but the
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Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 449; Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1383.
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He had the misfortune of having 400,000 dinars (or 200,00 dirhams or dinars) seized from
him by al-Wāthiq in 229/843: al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, pp. 1331, 1335. Al-Ṭabarī is uncertain of
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Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, p. 1403; al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, p. 451; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, III,
p. 1411; al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, p. 92 (for years 231-240).
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days later.91 The elimination of his brother, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, in the
following year (236/851) via being given surfeit of food with water withheld
enhances the certainty of this as an elimination, as does the death of Isḥāq’s
son in the same month.
All of the narratives that I have discussed underline that the Caliph’s power,
while imposing, was not absolute. He could bring low the mightiest of the
mighty yet had to do so through subterfuge and long term planning. The
necessity of the ruse and the disgracing and humiliation make the point of
the violence and capriciousness of the caliphal exercise of power but at the
same time clearly beacon and emphasize an underlying weakness of, or at the
very least, an extreme insecurity in, power.92 In discussing the demise of Ītākh
al-Ṭabarī portrays al-Mutawakkil as playing chess and as having positioned all
of his pieces deliberately. Tellingly he replaced Ītākh as Chamberlain with
Waṣīf when the former went on Ḥ ajj thus preemptively placating a potential
troublemaker.93 In both al-Yaʿqūbī and al-Ṭabarī, Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm’s motive for
killing Ītākh is not stated however one can infer that the Caliph had placed
two rivals in proximity and apparently gave Isḥāq an order to make use of the
opportunity. Al-Dhahabī states that “Ītākh al-Turkī al-ʿAbbāsī, the agent (of the
Caliph) was the sword of vengeance of the caliphate and al-Mutawakkil was
indeed afraid of him.”94 Al-Ṭabarī says something very similar by way of introducing the episode of Ītākh’s downfall and adds that Ītākh had been the one to
kill al-Maʾmūn’s sons by Sundus, Ibn al-Zayyāt in 233/847, and other powerful ﬁgures.95 He had been active as a loyalist alongside al-Afshīn in opposing
the plot of ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn and in so doing earned the respect of
al-Muʿtaṣim and a position of great power under him and al-Wāthiq. This balance of factions was a deﬁning feature of the exercises of caliphal power. However, when al-Mutawakkil lost control of the balance the implications for the
caliphal oﬃce and the independence of the ʿAbbasid family were disastrous. It
is interesting to ponder that unlike the third ﬁtna leading to the overthrow of
the Umayyads this series of events culminating in the murder of a caliph did
not lead into an ʿAbbasid style revolution. The ʿAbbasid dynasty at this point
in its history had been around for approximately the same amount of time as
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the Umayyad had when it was destroyed.96 The removal of Ītākh and those
who had placed him on the throne was one part of the process by which alMutawakkil solidiﬁed his position and attempted to gain independence of
action. Al-Ṭabarī certainly draws a link between the removal of Ibn al-Zayyāt
and how he had treated al-Mutawakkil when he was just a prince. Al-Yaʿqūbī,
even though he mentions no shūrā, clearly links the events by relating that
al-Mutawakkil’s ﬁrst act, after the acknowledgment of the ʿAbbasid family, was
to destroy Ibn al-Zayyāt. The Caliph had used Ītākh to eliminate Ibn al-Zayyāt
and he used Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm to eliminate Ītākh.97 Isḥāq arrested, tortured and
dispossessed ʿUmar b. Faraj.98 ʿUmar b. Faraj, Ibn al-Zayyāt, Aḥmad b. Khālid
Abū l-Wazīr and Ibn Abī Duʾād were either disgraced, killed or paralyzed
in one year. It is also during this period that he forbade discussion of the createdness/uncreatedness of the Qurʾān, thus beginning the end of the Miḥ na.
By the end of the summer of 233 only Ītākh and Waṣīf remained. Waṣīf maintained his powerful position until he was killed in 253/867. In 235/850
and 236/851 the three most important Ṭahirids in Baghdad had died. AlMutawakkil in the year 237/851 had the paralytic Ibn Abī Duʾād arrested and
dispossessed along with his sons by ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Sarī thus fully ending
the Miḥ na.99 The Caliph was playing powerful rivals oﬀ of one another. Underlying this are the complications of dynamic political interaction driven by
factional power sharing. The Caliph had to tread carefully and could not aﬀord
to alienate too quickly the individuals or they might unite against him. It is
clear however that he moved with all due haste. I suspect that he was able to
get away with this because his opponents underestimated him. This would
tend to conﬁrm that he was chosen because the powerful saw him as controllable, and sought to position themselves to do so while not taking into account
agency on his part. They were each interested in settling scores but did not
recognize until too late that they had lost in doing so. The Caliph was maintaining a balance of power between the rival forces in an eﬀort to insure his
independence but in the end played his hand too forcefully, skewed the balance of power and was assassinated. For al-Mutawakkil, the Miḥ na, in this
context, was but one component in that balance of power.
96
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Melchert places this (237/851) as the beginning of the end of the Miḥ na: Melchert, Religious
Policies, p. 325.

106

J. P. Turner / Oriens 38 (2010) 89-106

Appendix — Chronology of Events
232
23 Dhū l-Ḥ ijja (August 10, 847) — al-Mutawakkil enthroned
233
al-Mutawakkil forbids discussion of the Qurʾān
7 Ṣafar (Sept. 22, 847) — Ibn al-Zayyāt arrested
19 Rabīʿ I (November 2, 847) — Ibn al-Zayyāt killed
6 Jumādā II (Jan. 17, 848) — Ibn Abī Duʾād paralyzed by stroke
Ramaḍān (April-May, 848) — ʿUmar b. Faraj arrested by Isḥāq b.
Ibrāhīm
17 Ramaḍān (April 25, 848) — al-Faḍl b. Marwān removed from
Dīwān al-Kharāj
Dhū l-Ḥ ijja (July-August, 848) — Aḥmad b. Khālid Abū l-Wazīr
arrested
234
18 Dhū l-Qaʿda — Ītākh leaves on Ḥ ajj, replaced as ḥ ājib by Waṣīf
Dhū l-Ḥ ijja (July, 848) — Ītākh arrested by Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm
235
5 Jumādā II (December 21, 849) — Ītākh killed
23 Dhū l-Ḥ ijja (July 7, 850) — Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm died
26 Dhū l-Ḥ ijja (July 10, 850) — Succession Arrangement
236
Dhū l-Ḥ ijja (June, 851) — Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm killed
25 Dhū l-Ḥ ijja (June 29, 851) — Muḥammad b. Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm
killed
237
24 Ṣafar (August 27, 851) — Ibn Abī Duʾād and family dispossessed
1 Shawwal (March 27, 852) — Aḥmad b. Naṣr al-Khuzāʿī’s body buried
239
Dhū l-Ḥ ijja (May-June, 854) — Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Abī Duʾād
died
240
Muḥarram (June-July, 854) – Aḥmad Ibn Abī Duʾād died

